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Abstract 
Several authors have concluded that scientists should not attempt to perform overall animal 
welfare assessment (OWA). They argue that scientists have continued to fail to make 
progress in this area and that value judgements are inherently involved in OW A for which 
science cannot provide answers. We take a more positive attitude toward OWA and argue 
that scientists should avoid creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. OWA is necessary for making 
actual moral and political decisions. Science has already accumulated much relevant infor­
mation about welfare and this information should be applied in decision making. 
The task of OW A is to assess welfare based on knowledge of the biological needs of ani­
mals. Weighting of welfare relevant factors constitutes a problem. However, when scientists 
cannot provide empirical data to solve weighting issues, this does not mean that rational an­
swers cannot be found, e.g. in the form of procedural rules. OW A is conceived as a problem 
of multi-criteria decision making with fuzzy information. It focuses on the descriptive aspect 
of welfare, i.e. on what the welfare status of the animals really is without taking an ethical 
stance. The welfare status of animals depends on their biology and on the way animals assess 
their own welfare. It does not depend on how it happens to be perceived by us. Even though 
OW A necessarily remains a human activity, it is not arbitrary, nor does it allow of multiple 
'correct' answers. OWA is a descriptive activity that can achieve more and more accuracy as 
science proceeds. 
Keywords: welfare assessment, housing, decision support, weighting, ethics. 
Introduction 
Concern for animal welfare is an issue for many people. Expressing concern about 
welfare often presupposes making an assessment of the overall welfare-status. Many 
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people are convinced about the validity of their personal assessment of the welfare 
status of animals. However, differences in opinion appear hard to resolve. 
To help resolve these differences we are presently working on a model to assess 
the welfare status of farm animals on a scientific basis. Our goal is to develop a tool 
to perform overall welfare assessment (OWA), which can be used to support moral 
and political decision-making. For this purpose we are developing a kind of expert 
system, a decision support system (Bracke et al., 1999). Such a system requires a 
method to assess welfare in an explicit way and on a scientific basis. 
In this and the following part we will discuss various considerations for perform­
ing OWA. The second and third parts deal with available assessment tools and the bi­
ological basis for OWA respectively. In the present paper we will discuss the 
methodological question whether it is theoretically possible to perform OWA on a 
scientific basis. We are optimistic and believe OWA is possible. 
However, scepticism about OWA is widespread, even among applied ethologists. 
Several prominent authors in the field of applied ethology have concluded that sci­
ence is limited in its ability to determine 'overall' welfare or to compare welfare in 
disparate environments (Fraser, 1995; Rushen & de Passille, 1992; Dawkins, 1998). 
Some authors (e.g. Fraser, 1995; Tannenbaum, 1991) have provided a forceful 
methodological argument that may be used to justify this scepticism about OWA. 
They argued that welfare cannot be defined and studied as a purely technical, scien­
tific concept, because underlying value-related assumptions are inherently involved 
in OWA (Sandoe & Simonsen, 1992; Fraser, 1995; Fraser et al., 1997). In this paper 
we will argue against a sceptical interpretation of this methodological argument and 
explain why we believe it is possible to perform OWA on a scientific basis. 
Welfare definitions 
Welfare definitions have been reviewed by several authors (Rushen & de Passille, 
1992; Anon., 1992; Fraser et al., 1997; Stafleu et al., 1996), and were discussed in 
two relatively recent international conferences (see Journal of Agricultural and Envi­
ronmental Ethics 6, Supplement 2: 1993; Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica Section A, 
Animal Science, Supplement 27: 1996). Below we will discuss points of disagree­
ment and consensus to arrive at a subjective definition of welfare. Subjective defini­
tions of welfare tend to strengthen the sceptic view that OWA is not possible, but the 
discussion of welfare definitions will also provide a clue to reject scepticism. 
There appears to be general consensus regarding a number of properties relating 
to welfare (partly extracted from Broom & Johnson, 1993). (1) Welfare is a charac­
teristic of animals, i.e. it is a descriptive property of animals; it is not a property of 
the environment. Since it is generally agreed that animals have a welfare status, we 
will not be dealing with the Cartesian argument that animals may be automata lack­
ing consciousness (Bermond, 1997), nor with the application of Ockham 's razor so 
as to deny radically that welfare states can be known (Kennedy, 1992). (2) Welfare 
can range on a continuum from very poor to very good. (3) The results of scientific 
measurements are relevant for welfare assessment. (4) The scientific assessment of 
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animal welfare requires that a variety of measures must be employed. There is, at 
present, no standard welfare 'thermometer'. 
Welfare has been defined in various ways. Examples of much cited definitions of 
welfare are 'living in harmony with the environment and with itself, both physically and 
psychologically' (Lorz, 1973), and 'the welfare of an individual is its state as regards its 
attempt to cope with its environment' (Broom, 1986). Widely different concepts have 
been used to define welfare. They include (listed tentatively from the more objective to 
the more subjective): pre-pathological states (Moberg, 1985), stress, coping, fitness and 
adaptation ( e.g. Broom, 1986), predictability and controllability (Wiepkema, 1982), 
harmony (e.g. Lorz, 1973; Hughes, 1976), emotional states, wants, subjective feelings, 
suffering (Dawkins, 1988; Duncan & Petherick, 1991, Sand0e, 1996). 
A distinction has been made between subjective and objective definitions of wel­
fare (Mend!, 1991; Rushen & de Passille, 1992; Sand0e et al., 1996; Barnard & 
Hurst, 1996; Sumner, 1996). Objective definitions relate welfare directly to measur­
able parameters ( e.g. Broom, 1986). They tend to emphasise the importance of bio­
logical functioning and seem 'inspired' by the question how welfare can be mea­
sured in a scientific, objective way. By contrast, subjective definitions define wel­
fare in terms of subjective emotional states of animals, i.e. as what matters to the an­
imals from their point of view ( e.g. Dawkins, 1988, 1990; Duncan, 1996). Subjective 
definitions are more prevalent in the philosophical literature ( e.g. Singer, 1990; Re­
gan, 1983) and seem 'inspired' by the question how animals ought to be treated ethi­
cally (Rushen & de Passille, 1992). 
Subjective definitions have the problem how emotional states can be studied sci­
entifically (Mason & Mend!, 1993). On the other hand, objective definitions seem to 
have counterintuitive implications. Examples include cases of adaptive pain 
(Dawkins, 1980) and an unfelt tumour (example from Mason & Mend!, 1993). Ob­
jective definitions of welfare have these problems precisely because they are objec­
tive and accordingly fail to satisfactorily accommodate the perspectival (point of 
view) nature of welfare (Sumner, 1996). 
Stafleu et al., (1996) suggested an alternative classification that may help resolve 
these points of dispute. They distinguish three levels to define welfare: conceptual, ex­
planatory and operational. Operational definitions concern the question how welfare 
can be assessed or measured in practice; explanatory definitions concern how welfare 
may be conceived within a scientific framework; conceptual definitions identify the 
meaning of the concept of welfare at a philosophical level. This classification made by 
Stafleu et al. may relate to the subjective-objective dichotomy in two ways. If subjective 
definitions apply at the conceptual level and objective definitions apply at the explana­
tory or operational level, then apparent disagreement would be resolved by pointing out 
the difference in abstraction levels. On the other hand, if the objective-subjective di­
chotomy applies within the conceptual level, then the dispute is more fundamental and 
important theoretically, but may have relatively little practical ( operational) implica­
tions. Different approaches to welfare often lead to similar conclusions (Duncan & 
Fraser, 1997). The impact of cases like adaptive pain, unfelt tumours and injured uncon­
scious animals are probably of little importance for actual OWA in relation to housing. 
Furthermore, true proponents of an objective welfare definition are becoming 
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rare. Broom has generally been cited as a scientist defining welfare as an objective 
state. Recently, however, Broom (1998) re-emphasised the importance of feelings as 
part of his concept of welfare. Maybe there is more consensus on the issue whether 
subjective feelings of animals are a central part of the concept of welfare than would 
appear from the subjective-objective dichotomy. Sentience is generally accepted as a 
necessary condition for welfare. 'When people express concern about animal wel­
fare, it is precisely the conscious experience of suffering that worries them most' 
(Dawkins, 1998, p. 306). Non-sentient objects like machines, computers or plants do 
not have a welfare status, at least not in a sense that is relevant in a socio-political 
context (Stafleu et al., 1996). 
Therefore, when all agree that emotional states are an important part of welfare 
and some believe emotional states are sufficient to define welfare, it seems rational 
to opt for a subjective definition of welfare as a starting point for OWA. In effect, we 
suggest to restrict the use of the term welfare to the representation of what matters to 
animals from their point of view. We use the term welfare to denote the animal's 
quality of life as it is experienced and valued by the animal itself, i.e. its prudential 
value (Sumner, 1996). A central role in welfare is taken by the emotional states that 
can be ascribed to animals. The welfare state of an animal is determined by all the 
emotional states and only the emotional states in so far as they are experienced sub­
jectively by that animal. 
Restricting the use of the term welfare to subjective states does not correspond with 
some intuitive notions which people may have about welfare. Per definition, a 
drugged animal that is kept in a permanently euphoric state has a high welfare status, 
even though it may be questioned whether this is morally acceptable. Alternatively, it 
would be a category mistake to believe that an unconscious animal that is injured has 
poor welfare ( contra Broom, 1998). We would prefer to give such infringements an­
other name, e.g. harm to integrity, but would not say that the animal's welfare was af­
fected. We believe that to restrict the use of the term welfare to subjective emotional 
states will benefit discussions about welfare, because it can provide some conceptual 
clarity, which is much needed in this area. At the explanatory level, however, it is nec­
essary to explain the relationship between subjective emotional states on the one hand 
and theoretical concepts that can be measured, at least in principle, on the other hand. 
At the operational level, finally, welfare assessment must necessarily depend fully on 
observable attributes, for, in the end, all information about animal subjectivity must 
necessarily be derived from what is or can be observed about the animals. 
Because subjective definitions of welfare are the least 'measurable' of all defini­
tions, they make OWA even more vulnerable to sceptical criticism than objective de­
finitions do. Before we will discuss the main methodological argument we will 
briefly discuss a factual argument against OWA. 
A factual argument against OWA 
Rushen & de Passille (1992) stated that research has not been successful to perform 
OWA despite substantial political pressure. This observation may justify a recom-
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mendation not to attempt OWA, but it fails to support the sceptic conclusion that sci­
entists should not attempt OWA at all. Furthermore, even a well-intended recommen­
dation comes with the risk of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, warranting the 
question that scientists really tried hard enough to perform OWA. 
The clause 'despite substantial political pressure' indicates that previous efforts 
should be taken seriously. However, to our knowledge a complete review of 'failed' 
attempts to perform OWA has never been published. This makes it difficult to evalu­
ate whether previous attempts have been exhaustive. 
Finally, even if this claim were true at present, the factual argument will loose 
force over time. Developments in other fields, such as neurobiology or information 
technology, may bring new perspectives and possibilities for performing OWA. 
Some minor aspects of methodological scepticism 
Methodological scepticism about OWA concerns the limits of human cognition to 
know the welfare status of animals. 
One argument is that there seems to be a general methodological problem with 
OWA because similar attempts in other fields have also failed. Well known are 
methodological problems with IQ tests and the apparent lack of human health and 
welfare indices. Opposing this criticism we recognise the development and use of in­
dex scores in several related fields. Examples include the field of medical technolo­
gy assessment (e.g. McDowell & Newell, 1987; Streiner & Norman, 1995), psychi­
atric tests (the DSM IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994) as well as tools to 
quantify environmental impacts (e.g. Leuthe et al., 1996). Who hasn't been subject­
ed to tests in school or to a psychological test for a job interview? Several of these 
indices have proven their use. W hen developed carefully and when used with care, 
indices may be extremely valuable for certain purposes. This also applies to an index 
for animal welfare. 
A related argument is that welfare is not a constant feature. Welfare is a transient 
state which has multiple attributes and which is different under various circum­
stances (Dawkins, 1998). Similarly Fraser et al. (1975) argued that stress (read 'wel­
fare'), like disease, cannot be put on a unidimensional scale. Welfare varies in na­
ture; it varies over time; and it varies between individuals in a group. From this argu­
ment it follows that it is important to specify the exact circumstances. When this is 
done, we may, for example, state that the welfare status of a certain group of animals 
over a specified period of time is '7' on a scale from O to 10. This is a very short 
statement that conveys much information in a very efficient way. It specifies that 
welfare is reasonably good, but could still be better. Ideally, the scoring system 
should be transparent, in that a full explanation for this score can be given, including 
a specification of all underlying normative assumptions that were used to reach the 
welfare score (Sand0e & Simonsen, 1992; Fraser et al., 1997). Such a methodology 
for OWA could be of substantial benefit for decision making concerning animal wel­
fare. 
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The argument that values are inherently involved 
Fraser ( 1995) argues that science has a limited ability to compare welfare in systems 
that differ in a large number of features. Welfare is not a single attribute, like the 
height of a building, which can easily be measured in meters. On the contrary, wel­
fare is a complex attribute, more like the safety of a building. The safety of a build­
ing will be different for different types of users of the building (p. 105). Similarly, 
different people will judge the welfare status of animals as very different, because 
they emphasise different attributes of housing systems as most important for wel­
fare. 
Since welfare is a complex attribute, a large number of variables (behaviour, phys­
iology, productivity, health) must be taken into account. An overall welfare-judge­
ment is possible when one system outperforms the other in every respect (cf. also 
Taylor et al., 1995). However, a variety of measures are likely to yield a complex 
picture, with certain important advantages favouring each system. Fraser (1995) ar­
gues that science cannot provide the data that are necessary to decide which is the 
better system in such cases. In the absence of scientific facts value judgements are 
inherently involved in deciding which advantages of each system are most impor­
tant. 
This argument does not deny that animals have a welfare status about which sci­
ence can provide much relevant information to help reducing value-based differ­
ences in people's ideas about animal welfare ( e.g. Fraser, 1995, p. 106). Rather, the 
argument suggests that because science cannot solve value-based differences that are 
inherently involved in OWA, scientists should not attempt to perform OWA. 
We have attempted to cast the reasoning steps of this sceptical argument into the 
syllogism below: 
a. OWA requires combining many different attributes of housing systems that point 
in different directions. 
b. Combining attributes that point in different directions requires weighting them 
against each other. 
If a and b then c. 
c. OWA requires weighting attributes. 
d. Weighting attributes inherently involves value judgements. 
If c and d then e. 
e. OWA involves inherent value judgements. 
f. Descriptive statements cannot logically refute or confirm value judgements. 
If e and f then g. 
g. Descriptive statements cannot logically refute or confirm OWA. 
h. Science only makes descriptive statements. 
If g and h then i. 
1. Science cannot logically refute or confirm OWA. 
J. What cannot be done, should not be attempted. 
If i and j then k. 
k. Science should not attempt OWA. 
284 Netherlands Journal of Agricultural Science 47 (1999) 
OVERALL ANIMAL WELFARE ASSESSMENT I 
Reply to the syllogism 
The syllogism above contains 11 statements (a-k) involving five inference steps. The 
final conclusion (k), which is a value judgement (that scientists ought not to attempt 
OWA), is drawn from (i), which is a description (that science cannot prove OWA). 
This inference requires statement (j; that ought implies can, cf. Griffin, 1992) to 
avoid a naturalistic fallacy (statement (f) that descriptions cannot logically refute or 
confirm value judgements). This poses the question what science can and should do. 
Bekoff et al. (1992) correctly pointed out that an assessment of animal welfare is 
always an assessment from a human's point of view. Scientists tend to be very care­
ful when making statements about welfare, especially when it concerns the subjec­
tive states of animals, because as scientists they have a tradition of preferring parsi­
monious explanations that generally have been considered to exclude animal subjec­
tivity. This sceptical attitude with respect to welfare stands in sharp contrast with the 
apparent ease with which 'ordinary' persons seem to be able to assess the welfare 
state of animals with which they have at least some familiarity. Often such private 
claims about welfare are made with a strong conviction that they are accurate and 
valid. 
Recently, there has been a revival of putting the concept of welfare into an evolu­
tionary perspective ( e.g. Barnard & Hurst, 1996; Dawkins, 1998). For a moment we 
would like to put the human cognitive capacities regarding animal welfare in an evo­
lutionary perspective. Humans have evolved as hunter-gatherers and farmers. Being 
able to recognise states of animal welfare, such as sick or aggressive animals, is like­
ly to have increased fitness in humans. Wemelsfelder et al. ( 1998) found high inter­
and intra-observer consistency of spontaneous subjective assessments of pig behav­
iour. This finding supports the suggestion that human cognitive abilities may be 
quite accurate in representing welfare. In line with this view the role of science 
could be to provide accurate factual data as well as to expose possible defects in our 
cognitive abilities to assess welfare. 
The biological sciences that underlie welfare research seem to be unable to pro­
vide proof about animal consciousness. Opposing this demand, it has been argued 
that it may be unreasonable to demand proof in the case of welfare, because the un­
derlying sciences themselves generally concern issues of statistical significance (the 
5% probability level) rather than proof (Sambraus, 1981 ). Accordingly, instead of 
demanding proof, the task of OWA should be to provide the best possible solution or 
prediction of what the welfare status is, based on the scientific data that are available 
at the time the assessment is made. It follows that OWA is relative to the level of fac­
tual knowledge and this level may change over time depending on scientific 
progress. 
Furthermore, the idea that science only makes descriptive statements (statement 
(h) in the syllogism above) may be questioned. Science is not value-free (cf. Rollin, 
1990). Values are involved not only at the periphery of science, such as in deciding 
whether to allocate money to a project, but also more internal to science. Many de­
scriptive activities require interpretations that involve value judgements. Since the 
quality of science, both internally and at its periphery, can be better or worse, all sci-
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ences inherently involve values. In these senses, a scientific approach to OWA can 
be expected to be value laden as well. It follows that the (normative) claim that un­
derlying value notions should be made explicit ( e.g. Fraser, 1 995; Fraser et al., 1 997) 
applies to all scientific activities and is not specific for OWA. Therefore, the inher­
ent involvement of values in OWA cannot support a sceptical attitude unless values 
are involved in OWA in additional ways. We will discuss two such ways. One con­
cerns the weighting problem and the other is about ethical concerns. 
The weighting problem 
The weighting problem concerns the statements (a) to (e) in the syllogism. Although 
the statement (a) that many different attributes must be weighted, increases the com­
plexity of welfare assessment, and therefore also the risk of making errors, the 
methodological issue concerns the unitary case of weighting two attributes against 
each other. An example, given by Fraser ( 1995, p. 1 06), is to weigh freedom from 
coccidiosis and freedom of movement. It would be impossible to weigh such attrib­
utes against each other, especially when people differ about what is more important 
and when scientific data cannot decide between them. Another example concerns 
tethered sows: "Observer A ... may conclude that the welfare of ... sows tethered in 
stalls is high because the animals are well fed, reproducing efficiently and free from 
disease and injury. Observer B ... concludes that the welfare of the same animals is 
poor because they give vocalisations that are thought to indicate frustration, and they 
escape from the stalls whenever the chance arises. Observer C . . .  agrees that the 
sows' welfare is poor because stalls are unnatural environments which prevent the 
animals' natural behaviour" (Fraser et al., 1 997, p. 202). The sceptic may be tempted 
to conclude from such examples that everybody can be right about welfare. 
However, the way humans perceive welfare is not constitutive of the welfare status 
of animals. If observer A disagrees with observer B, then at least one of them must 
be mistaken. In the absence of proof, there is a second-best alternative, namely that 
procedure in which all available evidence has been taken into account in the most ra­
tional way. Rational OWA requires that reasons be provided for why certain aspects 
are believed to be more important than others. Rational OWA implies that the assess­
ment is based on observable and measurable data and that the point of view of the 
animals is taken into account as much as possible. 
Animals are able to compare widely different aspects of their environment (Mc­
Farland, 1 989). Where animals can compare, they themselves are the norm because 
welfare was defined as what matters from their point of view. Where animals cannot 
compare, e.g. when assessments concern effects that apply over longer periods of 
time or between individuals in a group, a method for OWA must resort to other ratio­
nal procedures (Sand0e et al., 1 996). The starting principle may be 'all to count for 
one, and nobody for more than one'. Adjustments to this principle are necessary, but 
must comply with the constraint of rationality, which includes, for example, the re­
quirements of consistency and reflective equilibrium. The method of finding a re­
flective equilibrium uses our most basic intuitions to develop principles which, in 
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turn, are used to evaluate our more peripheral intuitions ( e.g. DeGracia, 1996). In 
this respect OWA may be more akin to the social sciences and to philosophy than to 
the natural sciences. 
In the end, animals must provide the norm of what is more important freedom 
from coccidiosis or freedom of movement. The extremes are easy to weigh. Un­
doubtedly, the mildest case of coccidiosis is better than the severest-possible restric­
tion of space, while severe coccidiosis is undoubtedly worse than a mild restriction 
of space. Therefore, weighting of rather incompatible attributes, such as coccidiosis 
and space, is possible at least in extreme cases. 
The relative self-evidence involved in extreme cases may have led several authors 
to argue that instead of trying to assess overall-welfare scientists should take a prob­
lem-oriented approach, which entails identifying, rectifying and preventing welfare 
problems (Fraser, 1995; Rushen & de Passille, 1992). However, the problem-orient­
ed approach fails to be a proper alternative for OWA. In order to establish that a 
problem really is a problem and to establish that it is important, one must have some 
grasp of the overall context. For example, severe lameness is obviously a real wel­
fare problem. If this is a 'fact', then, by the same token, we have sufficient knowl­
edge to use this kind of knowledge as a basis for OWA: the problem-oriented ap­
proach constitutes a way of doing OWA (cf. Taylor et al., 1995). This would support 
our optimism about OWA. However, the problem-oriented approach is a rather nar­
row approach to OWA. It only concerns extreme cases and takes into account only 
the negative aspects of welfare. A more comprehensive view must also attempt to 
take into account less extreme cases as well as positive aspects of welfare. 
When weighting involves less extreme cases, a standard is needed to verify 
whether the outcomes of OWA are valid. However, no golden standard is available, 
because the private minds of animals will probably never be directly assessable 
(Nagel, 1974; Dawkins, 1993; Mason & Mendl, 1993). This increases the uncertain­
ty involved in OWA, but it may not be an insurmountable problem. OWA is not the 
only field lacking a golden standard. The same problem occurs in related fields, 
which we referred to above such as medical technology assessment and psychiatric 
tests. Validation of OWA may be performed in different ways. These may be based 
on a combination of optimism about our human cognitive ability to assess welfare 
and the ability of science to expose errors in this cognitive ability. 
Further progress in OWA beyond simple cases of weighting attributes requires 
finding a rational way to perform OWA in a systematic and explicit way. It is not a 
simple task to take into account all available data (Rushen, 199 1 ; Dawkins, 1997) 
and it is likely to require a multidisciplinary approach (Sand0e & Simonsen, 1992) 
involving multi-criteria decision making with fuzzy information. It would be nai:ve 
to believe that politicians can make decisions based on an accumulation of facts pro­
vided by scientists. The interpretation of facts involves weighting evidence, which is 
as much part of science as the gathering of data. In this respect OWA is itself part of 
the natural sciences. 
Several authors have also shown to be optimistic about solving the weighting 
problem. For example, Morton & Griffiths ( 1 985) propose that the various bodily 
and behavioural signs can usefully be given scores so that an accumulated score of 
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pain can be obtained. Taylor et al. (1995) and Appleby (1997) suggest that cost-ben­
efit analysis may provide a solution to the weighting problem. Fraser ( ! ,  personal 
communication) is also optimistic that schemes for combining different measures in­
to some kind of 'welfare score' can be developed if we really want to or need to, and 
that we could achieve some reasonable consensus among experts about which items 
are more or less important. This point illustrates that the authors we have quoted 
above may not be themselves as sceptical about OWA as would appear from the text. 
In our next paper we will review many other authors who have attempted OWA in a 
systematic and explicit way. This has made their work vulnerable for criticism, but, 
we will show, also open for further improvement. 
Ethical concern 
A second candidate why values may be thought to be additionally involved in OWA 
constitutes ethical concern. Fraser et al. ( 1997) interpret the task of making values 
involved in OWA explicit as identifying values underlying ethical concern. Like Tan­
nenbaum (1991) Fraser maintains that there is an 'inextricable connection' between 
animal welfare and ethical values. The term 'freedom' that was used to illustrate the 
weighting problem above, also has an ethical connotation (Fraser & Broom, 1990). 
However, welfare assessment per se is logically distinct from making an ethical as­
sessment. Ethical statements are ought-statements, i.e. they are prescriptive. Welfare 
statements are is-statements, i.e. they are descriptive. It is a natural fallacy to derive 
an ought from an is (cf. statement (f) in the syllogism above). A situation with poor 
welfare for animals may very well be ethically acceptable, for example when the in­
terests of the animals are outweighed by the interests of human beings, as may be the 
case in certain types of animal experimentation. Therefore, OWA and ethical assess­
ment are logically distinct from one another ( cf. Fraser & Broom, 1990, p. 256; 
Rushen & de Passille, 1992; Broom, 1996; Barnard & Hurst, 1996; Dawkins, 1998). 
OWA is not sufficient for ethical decision making. However, OWA is important 
and maybe even necessary for ethical decision making. There is widespread agree­
ment that welfare is a morally relevant property of animals (e.g. Vorstenbosch, 
1 993). Because the relationships between humans and animals in all human societies 
are so intimate that many of our decisions affect their welfare, we cannot ignore our 
ethical responsibility. Because of this responsibility we cannot do without OWA. 
Making factual claims, either explicit or implicit, about the welfare status of animals 
is unavoidable in human society. Therefore, OWA is necessary for practical reasons. 
In addition, OWA may be performed for purely scientific reasons, namely when 
viewed as the attempt to find out what the welfare status of animals really is, as ob­
jectively as we possibly can and on the basis of the best available knowledge. 
Because OWA is a descriptive activity, it must be possible to assess the welfare 
status of animals (provided they really have such a welfare status). However, welfare 
also has a prescriptive element in its meaning. Since welfare concerns what matters 
to animals from their point of view, it does inherently involve 'prescriptions' made 
by animals. By saying that welfare is poor, we identify, as it were, prescriptions is-
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sued by animals, which are of the kind 'let this not happen to me' . However, all pre­
scriptions also have a descriptive element in their meaning (Hare, 198 1,  p. 22) . Even 
matters of taste, which are highly subjective, have a factual aspect that can be report­
ed objectively. Mutatis mutandis, OWA involves the attempt to assess welfare de­
scriptively, even though welfare is itself a prescriptive property of animals. Also 
OWA does not violate the principle of parsimony, because the goal is not to explain 
observable phenomena based on mental states, but to assess mental states and wel­
fare based on observable phenomena. 
Conclusions 
During the last few years we have been working on a project to find a method to as­
sess welfare (OWA) on a scientific basis. This work has made us optimistic about its 
feasibility. However, we also perceive a sceptical attitude within the scientific com­
munity that may jeopardise progress in this field of research, because such scepti­
cism may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Our optimism has its origin in the be­
lief, which is shared by many people, that OWA based on knowledge of the facts is 
possible. This is because OWA can be conceived as multi-criteria decision making 
with fuzzy information that concerns the descriptive activity to determine what mat­
ters to animals from their point of view. Values are inherent in OWA in the way val­
ues are inherent in all scientific activities (and especially in many f ields of biology ). 
However, as a descriptive activity OWA is logically distinct from making an ethical 
assessment. When performing OWA many uncertainties, especially concerning the 
weighting of attributes, must be dealt w ith. For this a multidisciplinary approach is 
needed. Knowledge about the animal's behaviour and physiology should be used in a 
systematic way to assess their welfare, because the animals themselves should pro­
vide the norm of what is important for their welfare. Where science fails to provide 
final answers, OWA may benefit from more fundamental research. However, we also 
stressed the importance of finding rational procedures to integrate the large amount 
of knowledge that is already available in a systematic and explicit way. We are opti­
mistic that such a method for OWA can be developed. 
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